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Introduction  
 
This study provides a global overview of some traditional but mostly innovative 
approaches that have been suggested for social media (SM) regulation as presented 
in global and local media discourses. The aim is first to provide an overview of the 
debate and the main arguments and concerns, and second to systematise this in 
order to construct taxonomies. 
 
Before doing that, we explain why this topic is relevant to the broader academic, 
regulatory, legal, policymaking and public regulatory policies communities. There 
has been a sea change in approaches to SM regulation in many countries, especial-
ly in the European Union (EU) – both at the EU level and EU member state level 
(see, e.g. Spindler, 2017; Theil, 2019; Smith, 2019b), and in Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as in many other countries, especially in the last two years (2018–
2019). This paradigmatic change has also been reflected in national and global 
media discourses. Indeed, a large combination of the public, journalistic and aca-
demic opinions recently presented in the media have voiced suggestions on how to 
regulate SM, with an intensified debate since 2016, in EU countries as well as in 
some non-EU countries. 
 
There are at least two main global impulses and several strong local events or gen-
eral arguments supporting that development from a regulatory perspective. The 
first global push for more effective SM regulation originated after the Facebook–
Cambridge Analytica scandal in early 2018.2 This scandal revealed a huge abuse 
of personal data for commercial-political purposes by a third party with possible 
political-electoral impact. 
 
Second, it was the Christchurch (New Zealand) mosque shooting broadcasted via 
Facebook live for some time in early 2019.3 This scandal shocked the public due to 
the easiness of live video-broadcasting a religiously-motivated terrorist act and 
raised awareness regarding normative and legal challenges of sharing this type of 
messages.  
 
In between, a well-researched story by Frenkel, Confessore, Kang, Rosenberg and 
Nicas (2018) revealed how different were the public and private (in-house) ap-
proaches of Facebook’s executives to regulation. The later journalistic story (Hor-
witz & Seetharaman, 2020) revealing internal discussions of Facebook employees 
how Facebook researched ways to reduce the spread of divisive content on the 
platform since 2016, published by the Wall Street Journal, seemed to be less bal-
anced and more sensationalist (see Newton, 2020). In any case, Facebook provid-
ed a list of measures aimed at improving communication on Facebook introduced 
since that time (see Rosen, 2020). 
 
 
2 See e.g https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files 
3 See e.g. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting 
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Even earlier, in the UK context at least, the suicide of a British teenager in 2017, 
allegedly after viewing disturbing content about suicide on social media, caused a 
serious uproar amongst the UK public and politicians with calls for strict regula-
tion of SM (BBC, 2019). Similar events occurred in other countries, e.g. in Den-
mark, with calls for ‘responsibility’, ‘restrictions’ or ‘action’ (Williams, 2019)4, or 
riots with casualties in India associated with SM use in recent years. There was a 
case of the rape of a woman in Sweden, which was broadcast live on a closed Face-
book group with more than 60,000 members in 2017 (The Local, 2017). There was 
a live broadcast of killing an infant in Thailand in 2017 (The Guardian, 2017).  
 
It should be mentioned that online communication amongst terrorists, including 
terrorist communication on SM, led to initial discussions on SM regulation within 
EU already by 2016 (Boffey, 2018)5. Finally, secret Russian meddling into the US 
Presidential campaign in 2016 through SM (Savage, 2017; Galante & Ee, 2018; 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019), and the perceived negative 
role of SM during campaigning before the UK referendum on leaving the EU (Be-
noit & Matsuo, 2019; Fletcher & Selva, 2019; Hänska-Ahy & Bauchowitz, 2017), 
contributed to more urgent discussion on SM regulation. At the same time, it 
should be mentioned that many studies on how individuals’ engagement with digi-
tal technology influences peoples’ thoughts, emotions, behaviour, health and well-
being raise doubts about the effects of SM (Reeves, Ram, & Robinson, 2020). 
 
Even before these two global scandals and regional and local scandals shocked 
publics, regulators and politicians, criticism was increasingly voiced on how SM 
platforms operate. Indeed, at the EU level (and in some EU member states) there 
are some partial hard and soft regulations in force that target certain aspects of 
SM, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Copyright Directive, 
the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and the E-Commerce 
Directive, Brussels I.6, and the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation. Nonethe-
less, the European Commission is planning legislation that will force SM platforms 
to remove illegal content or face the threat of sanctions under a comprehensive 
‘Digital Services Act’.7 This draft directive was originally planned to be submitted 
for further public discussion by the end of 2020 (Murgia, 2019). In general, as put 
by Balkin (2020), ‘Social media companies are key institutions in the 21st century 
digital public sphere. ... Digital media become the key institutions that either main-
tain or undermine the health of the public sphere.’ 
 
4 The Danish government has set up an inter-ministerial working group, which is assessing possible 
initiatives and solutions regarding regulating content and liability on SM. It is expected that the 
working group will finish its work in autumn 2020.  
5 Weimann (2014) produced one of the first introductory studies on the use of SM by terrorists. In 
Israel, some called the wave of terrorist stabbing attacks that spread from late 2015 to mid-2016 
“The Facebook intifada”.Yet this appeared to be an exaggeration, see Issacharoff, 2015. 
6 See Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0001:0032:En:PDF 
7 See The Digital Services Act package, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-
services-act-package 
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Therefore, this article has both theoretical and policy relevance when it provides 
an overview and taxonomy of global discourses on SM regulation. 
 
 
The Importance of National Public Spheres for Global Regulatory Dis-
course  
 
A key challenge when it comes to EU-wide debates remains the prevalent fragmen-
tation of the EU media landscape along divisions of language. It is therefore very 
possible that debate on a certain topic may be limited geographically and may not 
be taken up across the EU. The original idea behind the selection of opinions and 
commentaries was to make usually less vocal local voices accessible in EU-wide 
debates on the various aspects of SM. Unfortunately, there are so many rapid 
changes occurring at technological, political and legal regulatory levels that some 
of the suggestions discussed below may already be obsolete. Moreover, it was re-
vealed that it is unnecessarily self-limiting to find inspiration for this topic only 
within the EU member states. Therefore, ultimately, for this study, we have ana-
lysed and summarised newspaper and journal articles (op-eds, interviews and 
more analytical articles) as well as, occasionally, blogs, from a broad range of Eu-
ropean and non-European countries. The aim of this exercise was to gain a more 
in-depth understanding of the political debates on SM regulation throughout the 
EU and beyond as articulated publicly by experts, journalists and regulators. 
 
Why do we study the global discourse on SM regulation? Clearly, the rapidly in-
creasing complexity of global communication infrastructures and technological 
convergence have facilitated easy national and sometimes transnational discus-
sions on global issues such as SM regulation, which, in some respects, requires 
global or, at least, a coordinated effort by the key global players. Monitoring global 
discourses as well as the possibility to contribute to a global public sphere is facili-
tated by modern technologies that allow automatic translation of almost any lan-
guage on the screen of a computer.  
 
However, there are some doubts about the importance of national media for global 
debates. Yet, if there is any example that supports the role of national media, in-
cluding specialised blogs, in global discourses, then it is exactly the debate on SM 
regulation that highlights the importance of national media discourses for a global 
debate. In this debate, national discourses are relevant, especially as an inspiration 
for suggested regulatory challenges and solutions and for monitoring the ongoing, 
rapidly changing regulatory and technological developments at a national level. 
 
The global and local media discourses are characterised by an implicit discursive 
power. Discursive power refers to the degree to which the categories of thought, 
symbolisations and linguistic conventions determine actors’ ability to control the 
actions of others, or to obtain new capacities (Reed, 2013, cited in Jungherr, Pos-
segga, & An, 2019). Jungherr et al. (2019) argue that discursive power is better 
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suited than established concepts for capturing the richness of influence in dis-
course across media. Legacy and/or new media are still crucial elements in the 
global and local dissemination of opinions and news and the reactions to and in-
terpretations of them (Fairclough, 2006). Indeed, national public spheres are 
gradually becoming de-territorialised through the ‘increased presence of global 
connections within the national framework’ (Hjarvard, 2001, cited in Olausson, 
2013, p. 1286). This can be seen in international editions of some national media 
outlets (e.g. The Guardian International), or in international and/or foreign 
communication/media supported by some governments (e.g. Al Jazeera English, 
RT), or in foreign language editions of national media outlets (e.g. Le Monde 
diplomatique in English). Moreover, national public spheres are providing per-
spectives on a problem that ‘both migrates across and transcends national frames 
of reference or explanation, exposing international interconnections, contextualis-
ing motives and exploring both the scope of the problem and its human conse-
quences’ (Cottle, 2009, cited in Olausson, 2013, p. 1287). In our case, it is the issue 
of SM regulation. This was the idea behind our motivation to summarise such ex-
amples of discourse on SM regulation in Table 1. Clearly, ‘a global news discourse 
… encompasses consensual and unifying constructions of the global as well as an-
tagonistic and polarising ones’ (Berglez, 2008, cited in Olausson, 2013, p. 1288). 
This perspective will be documented in Appendix 1, which lists global and local 
narratives, although it should be mentioned that we did not include viewpoints 
that opposed any regulation whatsoever. This is clearly no longer a viable option. 
Thus, it could be argued that this article is openly imbalanced. In summary, na-
tional discourses are becoming increasingly global ones regarding the issues dis-
cussed and have the potential to resolve some of the global issues.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This is an exploratory research project. Exploratory research is often used where 
causality is not of primary interest, such as is the case with our topic. Exploratory 
studies result in a range of causes and alternative options for the solution of a spe-
cific problem, and that is the point we are primarily interested in. There are limited 
or a lack of rules for collecting data in exploratory research. Nevertheless, explora-
tion can produce valid and insightful findings in social sciences if conducted in a 
transparent and self-reflexive way (Reiter, 2017). In short, exploratory research is 
not intended to provide conclusive evidence, but helps us to have a better under-
standing of the problem and identify new avenues and hypotheses to be further 
tested. 
 
Our approach is situated at the borderline between media content analysis and ar-
gumentative discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is largely a qualitative method; 
thus, the reliability and validity of the analysis cannot be ascertained in exactly the 
same way as in quantitative approaches. Out of a number of theoretically different 
discursive approaches (such as Foucault, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Habermas), we 
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primarily use here Habermasian-inspired discourse analysis. It focuses on the con-
sensual and consensus-generating aspects of discourse and on the analysis of dis-
course as a system of socially agreed upon justifications. Clearly, this approach is 
the closest to policymaking that seeks a consensus as well as to understanding dis-
course as rhetoric that is manifested in the form of discursive policy legitimation 
strategies. As a discursive strategy, legitimation consists of justifying and sanction-
ing a certain action (policy) or power, on the basis of normative or other reasons 
(Carvalho, 2000).8 In practical research terms for this study, it meant reading col-
lected articles with the aim of concisely identifying the suggested policies on SM 
regulation.  
 
Our final aim was to create a classification of SM regulation approaches emerging 
in a global discourse. There are two basic approaches to classification – typology 
and taxonomy. The key characteristic of a typology is that its dimensions represent 
concepts rather than empirical cases. Taxonomies differ from typologies in that 
they classify items on the basis of empirically observable and measurable charac-
teristics. It is arguable in the present case whether regulatory suggestions show 
empirically observable and measurable characteristics or whether they represent 
concepts. Apparently, regulatory suggestions seem to be in-between cases, possibly 
closer to the former than to the latter. However, Lenski (1994) explicitly mentions 
that taxonomies are useful both as a foundation for the formulation of basic theory 
and as a spur to further innovative research. 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 29–34) argue that sampling strategies for qualita-
tive research should be driven by a conceptual question, not by concern for ‘repre-
sentativeness’. We fully followed this methodological advice. Therefore, out of 
three suggested categories (1. Selecting apparently typical/representative exam-
ples, 2. Selecting negative/disconfirming examples and 3. Selecting exceptional or 
discrepant examples), we have focused on two categories (1 and 3, while we did not 
include viewpoints that opposed any regulation whatsoever, i.e. category 2 – nega-
tive, disconfirming examples). Moreover, at times, we went beyond our study time 
span (approximately 2017–2019) and included interesting examples from catego-
ries 1 and 3. Initially, partners in selected countries helped us to identify locally-
relevant articles in the second quarter of 2018, as can be seen in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Country of Origin of Articles in Original Languages 
(Total: 407) 
EU member states Number of 
articles 
EU member states Number of 
articles 
Austria 10 Ireland 14 
Belgium 8 Italy 20 
 
8 It is no coincidence that in China Foucault is seen as an author of the most suitable concept in 
philosophy explaining “procedures of prohibition” for online regulation in illiberal societies, see e.g. 
Guo (n.d.), Martin (2018).  
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Bulgaria 15 Latvia 40 
Czech Republic 22 Lithuania 19 
Estonia 37 Poland 13 
France 11 Portugal 31 
Germany 30 Romania 11 
Greece 15 Slovenia 20 
Hungary 10 Slovakia 50 
Estonia 37 Spain 31 
 
In addition, we also used Google Search with the key phrase ‘SM regulation’, or 
‘Facebook’, sometimes in translation, to get a truly global sample beyond the EU, 
ranging from Canada to Singapore. This sample included all relevant journalistic 
textual sources (as identified by the Google algorithm, and followed by a manual 
search). Finally, we did a specific keyword search within a selected group of the 
most promising newspapers and magazines. Our ultimate aim was to find as many 
articles as possible on alternative/novel approaches to SM regulation, thus ena-
bling further discussion and proper regulatory policy measure preparation. As 
mentioned, not ‘representativeness’, but rather diversity of regulatory suggestions 
and opinions was our primary focus. As we argue further, it is not necessarily a 
majority opinion, but it can instead be an innovative solution, suggested by a mi-
nority or individuals who can present truly (r)evolutionary regulatory or, typically, 
technological solutions. 
 
Based on our exploratory search, we find that the most productive global online 
media sources debating SM regulation more in-depth, over the long term and in-
ternationally are The Conversation and Project Syndicate, and amongst newspa-
pers, The Guardian (International Edition) and The New York Times. Within the 
EU, a very useful platform seems to be the Politico.eu portal which covers ‘Brus-
sels’ politics. The New York Times as well as German and British broadsheets (e.g. 
The Financial Times) and some weeklies (e.g. Focus, The Economist) have pub-
lished relevant long pieces on the various aspects of SM regulation.  
 
For clarity, and to document prevailing suggestions for regulating SM based on 
this global sample, we have created a set of taxonomy tables (Tables 2a–c) with 
content based on the extrapolation of key tools/approaches for regulation as 
shown in Appendix 1. We followed here Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen and 
Snelgrove (2016) who were inspired by Constas (1992, cited by the previous au-
thors) and have outlined a process of categorisation based on three components: 
(i) origination, (ii) verification and (iii) nomination. Sometimes, it was difficult to 
decide whether an author had in mind e.g. media literacy or public information 
campaigns. Another example was that, if an author suggested ‘stricter regulation’, 
we interpreted that as a call for public (state) regulation. However, it was not al-
ways clear whether a journalist reported his or her own ideas or simply para-
phrased someone else’s ideas from a conference. If there was any doubt, we indi-
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cated this with a question mark. Many suggestions were aimed at relatively specific 
issues such as fake news. In other cases, authors suggested solutions to multiple 
issues. Nonetheless, we believe that this overview may be useful for academics and 
other stakeholders. 
 
The material is divided according to the different levels of intensity of the suggest-
ed regulation. Thus, we start with soft, indirect and/or long-term measures to-
wards SM regulation of low intensity regulatory policy (Table 2a). This includes 
traditional self-regulation but also other measures. We continue with medium-
level intensity regulatory policy (Table 2b). This includes co-regulation but also 
many other regulatory measures. Finally, there is high-intensity level of regulatory 
policy. This includes, typically, public (or, as it is called in some countries, state) 
regulation (Table 2c). This division was inspired by economists who use indicators 
reflecting ‘the severity of business regulation’ (e.g. Loayza et al., 2004), ‘regulatory 
business burden’ (Djankov et al., 2006), ‘the quality of regulatory policy’ (Jalilianet 
al., 2007), ‘degree of regulation’ (Gorgens et al., 2003; all cited in Parker & Kirk-
patrick, 2012). Obviously, we use here only a tentative qualitative categorisation 
based on a very basic assessment. However, considering missing details about vir-
tually nearly all policy regulatory suggestions targeting SM, it was impossible to 
use any quantitative data in our case. Moreover, some suggested regulatory 
measures are hardly measurable (e.g. civil right audits). Our approach is summa-
rised in Legend A. 
 
Legend A (Type and Intensity of Regulation): 
General Approach 
to Regulation 
Encouraging/ 
Supporting 
Regulation 
Demanding/ 
Increasing 
Regulation 
Punishable/ 
Enforceable 
Regulation 
Level of Intensity of 
Regulation 
Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity 
Approximate Category 
in Traditional 
Regulatory Schemes 
Self-regulation Co-regulation Public/state 
regulation 
 
In order to make this overview even more analytically relevant, we also specified 
key groups of stakeholders: politicians/states, experts (academics/researchers), 
regulators, journalists and others (e.g. citizens, students) that were addressed in 
the articles that we analysed. This is presented in Legend B. 
 
Legend B (Stakeholders): 
Politicians/ 
states 
Experts Regulators Journalists  Others (e.g. 
citizens, PhD 
students) 
 
However, there was no general agreement found amongst any of these groups, or 
within any of these groups, on the best approach to SM regulation. There was how-
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ever a visible trend towards more strict regulation, ultimately meaning regulation 
based on the law, or some other state-backed or sponsored regulation. 
 
 
Global and Local Discourses on SM Regulation: The Results and Their 
Interpretation 
 
General observations 
 
Clearly, there are emerging global views regarding the steps that should be taken 
towards SM regulation and a global consensus that SM regulation is needed. How-
ever, there is not a full consensus either about the key issues that should be regu-
lated or what regulation of SM should look like.9 Interestingly, there is a clear 
trend in our material towards either innovative regulatory solutions, and/or rather 
radical solutions. However, in part, this is due to the nature of our sample because 
novel ideas are more attractive to media outlets and journalists in general (Ho & 
Liu, 2015). Within this context, SM regulation can perhaps be seen as a ‘bursting 
issue’. Bursting issues are driven by silent events that lead to short-term peaks in 
coverage (Geiß, 2018). This explains the limited attention paid to SM regulation in 
the media discourse. 
 
The foremost policy content issues discussed ranged from utilisation of SM by ter-
rorists, to data protection via the fight against fake news and hoaxes (information 
disorder) and protection of SM users against social harms in general, and back to 
data, especially algorithms and online digital identity protection. These narratives 
clearly follow the most dominant public issues at a particular period, as illustrated 
in the SM-related scandals mentioned earlier (terrorism and SM was a rather topi-
cal issue around and before 2016 (see, e.g. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 
2015). Some issues, such as a need for regulation of chatbots and digital assistants, 
SM influencers (partly covered by the revised AVMSD) or regulation of video deep 
fakes, could be identified within our sample only in the most recent period. 
 
Moreover, there is much discussion about increasing citizens/consumers’ self-
protective measures through e.g. media/data literacy. However, this is increasingly 
seen as a supplementary measure and not as a substitute for regulation. Similarly, 
there are suggestions targeting industry, i.e. to increase the quality of journalism 
and to enable more freedom as well as easy access to data stored on platforms. As 
one could expect, a common suggestion is to support public service media, which 
 
9 There are distinct domains of regulation (copyright issues, harmful content, fake news and 
hoaxes, surveillance, SM influencers, virtual reality, bots, etc.), different policy responses (notice 
and correct, notice and takedown, hard or soft approach, behavioural economy based and 
technology-algorithm based approaches, etc.), as well as the question of who should regulate and 
guarantee enforcement (self-, co-, and public regulation), or at which level (state or some global 
organisation, grassroot bodies or non-profit organisations) or some hybrid regimes. The issue of 
SM regulation can also be seen from the perspective of types of responsiveness: pyramidal 
responsiveness, micro-responsiveness, networked responsiveness, meta-regulatory responsiveness 
and socialist responsiveness (Braithwaite, 2017). 
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indeed play key information and educative roles in almost all EU member states. 
Yet, the traditional industry focus (to support the pluralistic legacy media and 
journalism, or public service media) may not be a sufficient mid-term perspective. 
Likewise, support for media education, critical thinking skills, digital data compe-
tences and media literacy amongst young and old people alike may work only in 
the long term. Nonetheless, regulatory actions are urgently needed. However, typi-
cal legal regulations are often challenged on constitutional (e.g. If there is a free 
speech, why should we limit or ban even fake speech?; see, e.g. Katsirea, 2018) and 
definitional grounds (e.g. What is fake news, and who should determine it?; see 
e.g. Epstein, 2017; Goda, 2020) or status-related issues (e.g. Which tweets should 
be fact-checked? Who does that fact-checking? Which get added context? What is 
the context that’s added? What makes that different from a newsroom?; see e.g. 
Bowles, 2020).  
 
Nonetheless, as noted in the above-mentioned Facebook–Cambridge Analytica 
scandal and the Christchurch shooting, these issues frequently have a global im-
pact. In this context, authoritarian states are able to act quickly and efficiently in 
their regulatory efforts, but liberal democratic societies are more limited in their 
legal and other regulatory measures. Moreover, the latter states usually discuss 
these issues in depth and for a longer period of time. However, it is true that, after 
the Christchurch shooting, some liberal democratic states, such as Australia, 
passed SM legislation rather quickly (Griffith, 2019). 
 
The first general observation that arises from comparing all three regulatory, in-
tensity-based groups/categories of approaches to SM is that the most frequent 
regulatory suggestions are in the ‘medium’ and increasingly in the ‘high’ intensity 
regulatory categories. This is true for both the number of original regulatory ideas 
produced as well as for the number of those participating in global discourse on 
this topic. 
 
The second important observation is that quantity of opinions should not be con-
sidered as an important factor without considering their communication context. 
From this perspective, this study challenges typical methodologies used in studies 
of this type. Our sample included mostly commentaries (op-eds) by stakeholders. 
As we previously mentioned, when stakeholders publish their ideas, they, as well 
as the media (editors), usually prefer novel ideas. There are some exceptions to 
this rule – such as when some ideas become deeply rooted in public discourse. For 
example, this is the case with media literacy. It has become such a popular topic 
and such an intuitively correct approach that it is difficult to question its effective-
ness and efficiency as an indirect regulatory tool. As a result, there is usually no 
need to question such a ‘truism’. It is, in a way, a safe way of arguing for or against 
efficient and effective SM regulation by anybody. One can argue that better or 
more media/data literacy programmes will be sufficient for eliminating all the 
harm caused by SM. Yet, some research shows that media literacy efforts can have 
little to no impact in specific cases, or even produce harmful effects as a result of 
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overconfidence (Bulger & Davison, 2018).  
 
The third observation is that this global debate has been, in part, influenced by 
global initiatives or local discussions about nation-specific initiatives. In other 
words, some national debates seemed to be influenced by regulatory efforts in the 
EU (e.g. earlier discussion on digital taxes in Europe or the more successful intro-
duction of GDPR) or elsewhere, or by local regulatory solutions (e.g. discussion in 
Uganda about taxing SM users instead of SM platforms). Thus, in many national 
contexts (e.g. in Ecuador), the focus of discussion has not been that much on alter-
native forms of regulations but rather on legislation enacted by governments.  
 
With regard to the authors having written the articles that we analysed, the dis-
course appears to be dominated by experts (in technology and/or law) and, to less-
er degree, by politicians. Regulators are not heavily represented in this national–
global debate either. The reasons for this lack of participation in a global discourse 
may have to do with the type of our sample which is partly based on self-initiative 
(only rarely do media invite specific, publicly unknown experts to contribute to 
such a specific debate, and even less often do they seem to initiate extensive pro-
fessional debate on very specific regulatory issues). Furthermore, politicians ex-
press their opinions in different forms rather than exclusively in commentaries: in 
interviews, press releases and similar formats. The commentaries, which do not 
include that many novel ideas, were, ironically, written by journalists engaged in 
writing op-eds. It is true that the journalists could contribute novel ideas if they 
were specialised journalists, or if they referred to a variety of experts and other 
stakeholders in longer analytical pieces. Somewhere between experts, politicians 
and regulators on the one hand, and journalists on the other hand, with respect to 
their level of novelty of suggested regulatory ideas, civic activists and citizens could 
be located.  
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Low intensity regulatory policies 
 
Table 2a: 1st Level – Low Intensity Regulatory Policies 
Suggested Regula-
tory Approach 
Supporting Stakeholders 
Politi-
cians/ 
states 
Experts Regula-
tors 
Journal-
ists 
Others 
Nation-specific so-
lutions 
(There are 
many such 
efforts) 
Vaidhyanat
han 
 Wenwen   
Public information  
campaigns/Public  
Pressure (incl. 
boycotts) 
(There are 
such efforts 
at the EU 
level and 
some 
member 
states lev-
els) 
Nye, 
McNamee, 
Tugend, 
Balkin 
 Malik, 
Gibbs, Re-
porters 
without 
Borders, 
Lucas, Aro 
Private 
companies, 
NGOs, 
YouTubers 
Courts Meier(?) 
(The courts 
intervene 
already) 
Ognyanova  Malik  
Taxation Danko, 
Austria, 
Brazil, the 
Czech Re-
public, the 
EU, India, 
Indonesia, 
Italy, 
Spain, Tur-
key,  
the UK  
Morozov, 
Muwema, 
Mutibwa  
 Schutz Raddi, 
Melioris, 
Owen, 
Woira  
Changes in Institu-
tional Framework 
Denmark 
France 
EU and 
many other 
EU mem-
ber states 
Greer 
Mazzucato 
Scalzi, 
Shane 
Van Alstyne 
   
Self-regulation by  
platforms 
Pope, 
Jourová 
Sharock-
man, Mar-
cus, Smith, 
Balkin, 
Zittrain, 
Gauci 
 Hadas-
Lebel, 
Geist 
Avni 
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If we focus on the most typical regulation in the case of the newspaper sector, i.e. 
self-regulation, we see that there are very few stakeholders who support this regu-
latory approach for SM. This cohort includes the Pope, EU commissioner Jourová 
(co-responsible at that time for SM efforts), two journalists, and some experts in 
this field. However, experts, for example Microsoft’s president and chief legal of-
ficer, Brad Smith, see the option of self-regulation as just one of a few regulatory 
options that are actually more intensive and comprehensive measures, including 
co-regulation.  
 
Historically, many critical indicators, including clearly-defined responsibilities, 
transparent regulatory processes and measurable results, adequate sanction pow-
ers, periodic reviews and external control by the general public and the state, have 
not been effectively prioritised in self-regulatory initiatives (Lievens, 2016). In-
deed, a recent report claims that some SM failed to ensure adequate moderation 
for non-Western countries that are in varying degrees of turmoil (Nicol, 2020). 
Similarly, Germany reported that major SM platforms did not follow their regula-
tory obligations as agreed with the European Commission (Eckert, Mannheim & 
Steinhäuser, 2020). Balkin (2020) has outlined a few arguments why, for example, 
Facebook’s Oversight Board for Content Decisions10, cannot be seen as a solution 
either. Yet, self-regulation can be also considered as focused on users, e.g. Gauci 
(2020)11 suggested empowering the user to self-exclude himself from overuse of 
SM as in the gaming industry. Finally, although the European Commission repre-
sentative talked about self-regulation, the European Commission has in fact 
moved towards co-regulation, or enforced institutional self-regulation, and is ap-
parently shifting further towards public regulation. 
 
Taxation is supported by a more diverse range of stakeholders and quite a diverse 
coalition of states. Although we note here only a few stakeholders supporting the 
taxation of SM platforms, there is a caveat that should be mentioned. Taxation 
(typically, ‘digital services tax’ for SM platforms) has been on the agenda for some 
time and has already been introduced in some countries (Asen, 2019). Indeed, 
some indirect forms of regulation, such as a call for taxation of SM platforms 
seemed to be topical but proved to be short-lived at the EU level in early 2019 
again, followed by some initiatives in that direction at the member state level.12 For 
example, France has openly declared its determination to tax big digital business 
regardless of resistance from the US (Thomas, 2020). Thus, some stakeholders 
may not have considered it necessary to raise this issue again. Taxation can be seen 
as an indirect levy for the social harms caused by SM (a situation similar to the to-
 
10 See https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/facebook-oversight-board-for-content-
decisions-overview 
11 Inspired by a Josh Hawley, a Republican Senator from Missouri, who unveiled the Social Media 
Addiction Reduction Technology Bill. 
12 The EC’s proposal faced steep opposition from certain EU member states and in early 2019, a 
year after the proposal was first announced EU member states’ finance ministers formally 
abandoned the proposal. The EC then confirmed that it would focus on the broader international 
tax discussions underway at the OECD and G20 level, and that if progress was not made by the end 
of 2020 on global efforts, the EC would revisit the issue (Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, 2019) 
Vol.10No.1Spring/Summer 2020  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
14 
 
bacco industry; see e.g. Benioff in Focus (2019). Indeed, as a result, national dis-
courses and adopted policy measures can be different at a national level, although 
there has been an attempt to coordinate this discussion about digital taxation 
globally by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) (see Leonard & Davison, 2020). Moreover, it may not always be 
clear whether taxation aims, first of all, to protect citizens from social harms 
caused by SM (preventive role; see e.g. Woira, 2018) or to punish SM for causing 
social harms (corrective role), or if it is simply a tool for collecting more taxes (fi-
nancial role). Also, digital services taxation aims more broadly than just at SM – it 
includes the Google parent company, Alphabet Inc., and Amazon, for example. Fi-
nally, it should be mentioned that there was an unusual approach to taxation in 
Uganda. Instead of taxing SM platforms, the government taxed SM users (see dis-
cussion on this issue in Mutibwa, 2018; Muwema, 2018; Woira, 2018). 
 
Public pressure and public information campaigns are typical tools used for influ-
encing attitudes about policies amongst the general public, or for gaining ac-
ceptance of governmental policies by the general public. However, the idea behind 
public information campaigns goes further here. They are intended, as done by 
Reporters Without Borders, to support projects that aim at publicly labelling (by 
experts or journalists) high-quality versus low-quality journalism. The reason be-
hind this approach is that SM has, in many countries, become the key (mis-and 
dis-)information source for the less educated masses (or citizens not involved in 
politics on a day-to-day basis). In that sense, this policy is close to, but still distinct 
from, media/digital/data literacy programmes. Furthermore, there is the 
crowdsourcing approach as suggested by Pennycook and Rand (2019). This means 
building audience judgments into an algorithm ranking stories by quality. Imple-
mentation may be slow because platform providers may resist this approach, but 
Dreyer and Ziebarth (2014) argue that the process has many benefits for the pro-
viders as well. There is also the manifesto from the Dagstuhl Perspectives Work-
shop that suggests optimising the role of public values in news recommenders.13 
One can include in this section also short-term boycotts of some SM, or the boycott 
of advertisements that finance operations of SM. This already happened in 2017 
(Statt, 2017; Davies, 2017), had been discussed throughout 2019 (D'Onfro, 2019) 
and came again on the agenda in 2020 (see Dang, 2020; Hern, 2020; Theile, 
2020).  
 
Institutional changes include those discussed earlier and those introduced by 
France and Denmark in particular. The state institutions have adjusted to the re-
ality of big private players whose impact goes far beyond typical private mass pro-
duction (e.g. automotive industry). One can include here nation-specific responses 
(such as special departments affiliated with police, intelligence services, ministries 
of foreign affairs or other state bodies tackling misinformation in particular or so-
 
13 Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.09495, posted on 19 May 2020. 
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cial harms in general), or EU-wide solutions such as the East Stratcom Task Force 
(2015)14 or the European Digital Media Observatory launched in 2020.15 
 
Fundamentally, Napoli and Caplan (2017) argue that SM platforms fit quite well 
within the established parameters of media organisations. SM platforms are not 
neutral providers; they influence and they already intervene in various areas (Gil-
lespie, 2015). Of course, there are lobbyist groups, but in the case of SM platforms, 
this is a more fundamental and more political issue. Indeed, almost all SM are on 
platforms that are both transnational and private (Flew, 2015). Thus, Mazzucato 
suggests, amongst other ideas, developing a new governance structure, including a 
new vocabulary. This represents a call for new ways of thinking about an issue. 
Greer, the deputy director of the Viral Digital Rights Group, recommends, 
amongst other regulatory choices, civil rights audits. We can only assume that this 
would mean inclusion of NGOs in the process. Similarly, Scalzi, a science fiction 
writer, would turn the whole system on its head with an intense emphasis on the 
value of curation by individual users. This idea is discussed further with similar 
ideas presented in Table 2b, together with Scalzi’s additional ideas that are de-
scribed below within specific rubrics. Shane, an algorithm designer, goes in the 
same direction as Mazzucato, while Scalzi argues that we need intervention by 
humans if we want to maintain and curate the digital public spaces according to 
our wishes. In other words, this seems to be a project of purposefully designed SM 
with a preference not for market criteria, but for other truly social and democratic 
ones. Van Alstyne, a professor, develops these somewhat fuzzy ideas further and in 
a more balanced way. In Van Alstyne’s view, the ideal solution is somewhere in be-
tween the EU and the US approaches (to have companies create value but taking 
into consideration the supply side versus demand side).  
 
Finally, Noble suggests that future SM public platforms should set limits on how 
quickly content circulates, or, as put by Mirani (2020), SM should reintroduce fric-
tion into their sharing mechanisms. This is actually one of measures already intro-
duced by Facebook – shifting the News Feed to include more posts from friends 
and family than from publishers. Moreover, Facebook reduced clickbait headlines 
and links to misleading and spam posts, and it has improved how comments are 
ranked to show people those that are more relevant and of higher quality (Rosen, 
2020). These measures reflect an institutional self-regulatory approach as suggest-
ed in general terms by some stakeholders.  
 
Regarding the courts as regulators, it is obviously arguable how intensive this ap-
proach can be considered from a regulatory perspective. The point for including 
this stakeholder in this first group of low intensity regulation was that the judiciary 
is actually already acting as a regulator, especially if there is no other proper regu-
 
14 See Countering Disinformation at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/59411/Countering%20disinformation 
15 See https://edmo.eu/ 
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latory option. This may, again, explain why so few stakeholders discussed this op-
tion here. 
 
Nation-specific policy solutions, as proposed by Vaidhyanathan (2019), may be 
seen as necessary if there is no regional (e.g. EU level) or global agreement on SM 
regulation (e.g. role of OECD regarding taxation of SM). For example, this includes 
the Australian and German approaches to SM regulation by the law, or the ap-
proach to taxation of SM platforms by France and other countries. Thus, nation-
specific solutions are typically adopted (usually in the form of a law) or seriously 
considered by governments that either act in response to an urgent regulatory cri-
sis, show in general more authoritarian tendencies (e.g. Russia, China) or are able 
to enforce their SM regulation due to their size (meaning big market) and efficient 
legal and administrative governance (e.g. Germany). There are possibly other ex-
amples and reasons why nation-states (including smaller states) or supranational 
bodies adopt SM regulation, but those mentioned here are perhaps the most typi-
cal ones. We shall discuss a unique case of US President Trump’s 2020 ‘de-
regulatory’ call for specific de-regulation of SM further on. 
 
Now, we turn to the most frequent group of suggestions at the ‘medium’ intensity 
level of regulatory policies aimed at social media. 
 
Medium intensity regulatory policies 
 
Table 2b: 2nd Level – Medium Intensity Regulatory Policies 
Suggested Regula-
tory Approach 
Supporting Stakeholders 
Politi-
cians/ 
states 
Experts Regula-
tors 
Journal-
ists 
Others 
Co-regulation (it exists at 
EU level) 
Karentay, 
Smith, Balkin 
  Aktoudianakis 
Shareholders 
activism 
    Greer 
Transparency/ 
Data sharing/ 
Algorithmic 
Changes 
King 
 
Sängerlaub, 
Zittrain, 
Mayer-
Schönberger, 
Ognyanova, 
Owen, Gauci 
Buttarelli Swisher, 
Hendrix 
Brock, 
Aktoudiana-
kis, 
Tremonti, 
Brossi 
Media/Digital/ 
Data literacy 
Fitzgerald, 
Hadas-
Lebel 
Sharockman, 
Bátky, Pikus, 
Solano, 
Jürgen(?), 
Villmann,  
Dekov, 
Michalovová, 
Gauci 
 Hadas-
Lebel 
Afoko, 
Lucas 
Open Society 
Institute, 
Gibbs  
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Employee 
organizing 
 Tufekci,  
Tugend 
  Greer, 
FB employees 
actions in Oc-
tober 2019 
and again in 
May/June 
2020, 
Feierstein  
Cooperation with 
fact checkers 
Collins  Han 
Sang-
hyuk 
  
Platforms 
as public service 
 Marcuzzi and 
Terzi, 
Coatney, 
Hall, Wu, 
Weissmann 
   
Multistake- 
holderism 
 Vaidhyanath, 
Tugend, 
Barrett, 
Kendall, 
Owen, 
Gutiérrez, 
Dans, Gauci 
  Svantesson, 
the Internet 
and 
Jurisdiction 
Policy 
Network(?) 
International 
Co-operation 
 Marcuzzi and 
Terzi, 
Melioris, 
Owen, 
Gutiérrez 
   
Independently 
owned 
servers/new 
publicly owned 
social media 
Verhof-
stadt 
Newport, 
Tusikov and 
Haggart, 
Mazzucato, 
Noble, Scalzi 
Mutabazi   Raddi 
 
Let us start with the most popular category of regulatory suggestion in our sample, 
which is media/digital data literacy. This has been a buzzword for more than a 
decade. However, it seems clear that media/digital (or, most recently, data-) litera-
cy is not a sufficient regulatory solution. First, there are always some users who are 
ignorant or less knowledgeable. Second, choices offered (‘please accept these cook-
ies’) are sometimes deliberately too complex or time-consuming for the average 
user to manage (they include multiple levels, sometimes with dozens of ‘choices’). 
Third, there is no way for us to retract information that previously seemed harm-
less to share (Zittrain, 2018). In general, experience tells us that media literacy can 
help but cannot stop SM harms of all kinds. Yet, it is always safe to argue that we 
need more education and enlightenment.  
 
Media/digital literacy is closely related to transparency/data sharing. Fortunately, 
the EU’s GDPR has proven to be useful, at least in preventing the massive abuse of 
data (European Commission, 2019). Crucially, the GDPR limits the use of algo-
rithmic decision-making. Of course, there are some challenges (see e.g. Houser & 
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Voss, 2018; Li, Yu & He, 2019). Transparency also includes the issue of how algo-
rithms operate. As put by Hunt and McKelvey (2019, p. 319): ‘Thinking of algo-
rithms as policy instruments implies reconsidering coding as policymaking’. No 
wonder that, in terms of frequency, technical/editorial solutions follow and over-
lap both media/digital literacy and transparency/data sharing regulatory solu-
tions. It is no coincidence that nearly all experts are amongst the group of stake-
holders who support the technological regulatory approach instead of media/data 
literacy programmes. This is certainly the case amongst the most effective and effi-
cient approaches to regulation, which attempt to overcome human limits and fail-
ures. Algorithms represent ‘black box policy’ by translating its norms and rules in-
to inscrutable and often proprietary systems that cannot be publicly investigated 
due to intellectual property or security concerns’ (p. 319). Most importantly, ‘Algo-
rithmic regulation can vary in its efficacy depending on the content …(if there are) 
enough structural barriers then algorithms may not be effective, or worse, may 
perpetuate the problem’ (p. 319). Hunt and McKelvey (p. 326) also have devised 
key questions that form a framework to analyse different formulations of algorith-
mic accountability policy.16 
 
There also has been an attempt to simultaneously investigate media/digital litera-
cy, legislation requirements and algorithms. For example, Richardson (2017) fo-
cuses on the age limits when accessing SM. Richardson believes that ‘there is only 
one correct way on how to enforce age limits when accessing SM and it is gathering 
personal data from children and cross matching anything that could inform about 
the child’s age.’ Yet at the same time, this is certainly a controversial and potential-
ly problematic regulatory approach as collected data can be accessed by hackers. In 
contrast, Karentay (2017) has proposed general regulatory principles. In his view, 
content standards should be interpreted and operationalised on SM platforms 
through an inclusive mechanism. Although it is not quite clear what this means, 
Weissmann (2019) perhaps provides an answer, suggesting that it might be useful 
to consider regulation of SM platforms, as far as the use of data is concerned, in a 
similar relationship to that which patients or clients have with doctors and law-
yers. Weissmann here refers to the ‘information fiduciary’ model for SM compa-
nies as developed by Jack Balkin (Balkin, 2020; Balkin & Zittrain, 2016).  
 
This discussion suggests co-regulatory principles, including ‘a system of public ac-
countability’. It is clear that some regulatory suggestions, as well as ideas about 
multistakeholderism, as presented in Table 2b, overlap with co-regulation. Howev-
er, co-regulation as an option is explicitly mentioned only by Karentay and Smith 
from Microsoft. In general, multistakeholderism and international cooperation 
may be seen rather as tools for achieving above-mentioned objectives. In other 
words, these are not policies per se. Be that as it may, the European Commission 
agreed with Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube (later joined by some other 
 
16 Their questions were: Are inputs to algorithmic systems justified? How do algorithms function as 
forms of regulation? Are algorithms an appropriate instrument in the known situation or cultural 
context? 
Vol.10No.1Spring/Summer 2020  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
19 
 
SM) on a ‘Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online’ in 2016. This 
policy solution can be seen as co-regulation or enforced institutional self-
regulation. Yet, there have been debates that this approach may be seen as going 
against constitutional rights and, in general, that it is not sufficient – there is no 
due process. Also, this does not cover all the SM, and it mainly covers hate speech 
(see e.g. Bayer, 2019; Leerssen, 2015). Moreover, public debate is regulated (or 
not) by private actors operating outside the direct reach of human rights law, while 
EU policy initiatives combatting illegal content on SM platforms encourage and 
legitimise the private regime of content regulation (Jørgensen & Zuleta, 2020). In-
ternational cooperation is the most visible within the current OECD lead discus-
sion on digital taxes.17 
 
Multistakeholderism is receiving support amongst recent studies, e.g. Helberger, 
Pierson and Poell (2018) argue that the enabling of public values in platform-based 
public activities cannot be adequately achieved by allocating responsibility to one 
central actor but should be the result of dynamic interaction amongst platforms, 
users and public institutions. They call it ‘a framework of cooperative responsibil-
ity’ within which they identify four key steps to organise the (re)distribution of re-
sponsibilities.18  
 
Collin’s suggestion for ‘formalising Facebook relationship with its third-party fact-
checkers in the long term’ is, as we have discussed, already a reality.19 It should be 
mentioned that there was similar idea raised in (South) Korea. Han Sang-hyuk, 
chairman of the Korea Communications Commission, considered the establish-
ment of an independent institution responsible for checking facts. There is already 
an extensive international network of fact-checking organisations.20 
 
The regulatory proposals discussed so far seem, by and large, to reflect traditional 
solutions. However, one can also find in this group rather novel and sometimes 
revolutionary regulatory suggestions. These include internal pressure, from inside 
the SM platforms, such as employee organising or shareholder activism. There is 
the example of a prior action in October 2019 when a few hundred employees of 
Facebook raised their voices, calling for different regulation of political ads.21 This 
 
17 See OECD, Going Digital, https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/topics/tax/ 
18 The first step is to collectively define the essential public values at play in particular economic 
activities and modes of public exchange. The next step is for each stakeholder (platforms, 
governments, users, advertisers, and others) to accept that they have a role to play in the realisation 
of these values. The third step is to develop a (multi-stakeholder) process of public deliberation and 
exchange. The fourth step is to translate the outcome of public deliberation and agreements into 
regulations. 
19 See How is Facebook addressing false news through third-party fact-checkers?, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536, Where We Have Fact-Checking. A Map of 
Face-book's Global Third-Party Fact-Checking Partners, 
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map 
20 See The International Fact-Checking Network, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/ 
21 Read the letter Facebook employees sent to Mark Zuckerberg about political ads on 28 October 
2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/technology/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-
letter.html 
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was certainly a unique action that deserves more attention from analysts and 
stakeholders. Moreover, there were some publicly raised voices amongst current 
and former Facebook employees regarding Facebook policies in spring 2020, fol-
lowing a controversial tweet on social media regulation by President’s Trump 
(Hern & Wong, 2020; Isaac, 2020). One can perhaps include here an already dis-
cussed controversial piece published in 2020 (Horwitz & Seetharaman) that re-
vealed internal discussions of Facebook employees concerning how Facebook has 
been researching ways to reduce the spread of divisive content on the platform 
since 2016 (It appears that the first news on this topic was published already in 
2016 (Frenkel, 2016). Feierstein (2020) has gone even further, calling for provid-
ing whistle-blower protection and rewards to any SM employee willing to provide 
evidence that leads to the conviction of management or other employees harming 
society or individuals, and prohibiting government agencies from advertising on 
SM. 
 
Regarding shareholder activism, this is a rather counter-intuitive idea. Since SM 
platforms are private enterprises, shareholders are primarily motivated by profit. 
Thus, it would mean turning capitalism on its head to expect shareholders to go 
against their own economic interests (see also Balkin, 2020). Of course, it could be 
possible to get states to intervene here. For example, the states (or a group of 
states) could become shareholders, either through partial or full nationalisation of 
some SM (with reimbursement to owners), or by purchasing freely available shares 
on the stock exchange. Both options are costly. 
 
External pressure from the ‘outside’ includes suggestions to turn to independently 
owned servers or new publicly owned SM as well as to change the mission of exist-
ing platforms to public service22 (including, perhaps, the most radical suggestion, 
the nationalisation of major platforms). For example, Scalzi believes that crowd-
funding could create a public broadcasting version of YouTube. This is open for 
further debate as to whether this approach could work. It should be mentioned 
that, for example, Hungary used to have its own version of Facebook called iWiW. 
This network was cancelled in 2014 due to expected financial losses (as a result of 
competition of other, more technologically advanced platforms) (Leanyfalvi, 2014). 
On the other hand, for example, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland all have 
their own national social networks similar to Facebook: pokec.cz, pokec.sk and 
NK.pl (Nasza Klasa), respectively. Yet, the Czech pokec.cz and Slovak pokec.sk23 
are, comparatively, almost irrelevant as SM platforms, while the Polish NK is be-
coming less popular. The turning point for NK came around 2015, when it failed to 
catch up with constantly technologically evolving Facebook (Urbańczyk, 2019). 
Maybe a pan-European SM platform, funded by public resources (e.g. in coopera-
 
22 There also is a book by Milborn and Breitenecker (2018). Change the Game: Wie wir uns das 
Netz von Facebook und Google zurückerobern, in which the authors argue in favour of 
cooperation between private platforms and public interests. 
23 Najväčšia zoznamka na Slovensku (The Biggest Social Platform in Slovakia), 
https://pokec.azet.sk/?force_login=1&isMobilePokec=1&uri=https%3A%2F%2Fmpokec.azet.sk%2
F 
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tion with public service media) could provide sufficient technological and financial 
backing for successful development of alternative SM platforms. Yet this would be 
a risky project as it is well known that habits of SM users change, when some SM 
become outdated, or are preferred only by certain sectors of population (Havlík, 
2018). It is also well known that Google (Alphabet) failed repeatedly in its at-
tempts to create an attractive SM platform as an alternative to Facebook. Shoelace 
(which was open on an invite-only basis) was Google’s most recent attempt to suc-
ceed in social space after their failed attempts with Google Buzz, Google Friend 
Connect, and Google+ (Kahla, 2019).  
 
Now we turn to high-intensity regulatory policy proposals that generally reflect 
traditionally understood public/state regulation. 
 
High-intensity regulatory policies 
 
Table 2c: 3rd Level – High Intensity Regulatory Policies 
 Politi-
cians/ 
states 
Experts Regula-
tors 
Journal-
ists 
Others 
Banning targeted  
advertisements 
 Tufekci, 
Tusikov and 
Haggart, 
Owen, Dans, 
McDonald 
 Edelman, 
Mahdawi 
Raddi, 
Dayen 
Breaking up the 
SM platforms/ 
antitrust 
legislation 
Verhofsta
dt, some 
U.S. 
Senators, 
Giegold 
Morozov, 
Greer, 
Doctorow, 
Hughes, 
Balkin 
Buttarelli Brodnig   
Data Privacy 
Legislation 
(for EU, 
there 
already is 
GDPR) 
Zittrain Buttarelli Ivančík Boskin, 
Greer, 
Raddi, 
Tremonti  
Business/ 
Broadcast-type  
Regulation 
Klöckner, 
Collins, 
Porter(?),  
UK MPs 
Marcuzzi and 
Terzi, Basu  
Kukliš  Cohen, 
Benioff, 
Křetínský(?) 
Fines/Fees  Greer, 
Balkin(?) 
Pitruzzella  Feierstein  
Public/state 
regulation 
Orbán, 
Hadas-
Lebel(?) 
India, 
Germany, 
France, 
UK 
(EU – 
Digital 
Services 
Act, draft 
idea) 
Tufekci, 
Mayer-
Schönberger, 
Tufekci(?) 
Zuckerberg, 
Berners-Lee, 
McNamee, 
Zuboff, 
Tugend Cook, 
Balkin,  
Borata 
Weissmann 
Pitruzzella 
Mutabazi  
Buttarelli 
Kováčik, 
Swisher, 
Hendrix(?
),  
Rodríguez
(?),  
Busse,  
Esslinger, 
Bialek 
Amnesty 
Internatio-
nal, 
Soros, Avni 
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Jun 
(China) 
+ many 
other 
states 
 
All regulatory suggestions within this group seem to be based on the law. In any 
case, they all have in common the idea of applying binding and legally enforceable 
commitments on the part of SM platforms.  
 
Public/state regulation and business/broadcast-type regulation are not necessarily 
identical approaches. While the former can take different forms (of which some are 
presented Table 2c), the latter is more similar to legislation for legacy audio-visual 
(or, in some cases, print) media. In some cases, public regulation can and does 
build upon existing institutions, such as antitrust authorities, or can mean revisit-
ing such authorities as the federal Office of Technology Assessment in the US as 
suggested by Weissmann (2019). 
 
It is well known that experts are commonly sceptical about jurisprudence concern-
ing SM issues from a global, or even federal state, perspective. For example, Mur-
ray (2017) believes that there remains an unresolvable conflict of laws (i.e. inter-
nal/external extra-territorial effects). Similarly, in respect to the US federal con-
text, Fisher, Hutchins and Goodman (2020, pp. 116–117) believe that, if individual 
state governments were to implement SM regulations, they would likely be ruled 
unconstitutional in a court of law. If platforms had to conform to 50 different sets 
of state laws regulating content, this would, first, place a burden on free speech, 
and second, platforms would have a wide range of local standards to meet, and 
therefore, the law might suffer from vagueness. US federal laws bring their own set 
of complications and limitations since any regulation would have to meet the free 
speech standards of the First Amendment. Instead, the authors suggest institu-
tional self-regulation, referring to the famous Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Committee verdict of 2010. The platforms can allow speech to occur at their discre-
tion. In other words, ‘There is no constitutional right for a speaker to invoke free 
speech on Facebook or YouTube or other outlets because the rights to free speech 
are held by the corporations that own the forum’ (Fisher, Hutchins, & Goodman, 
2020, p. 119). 
 
Furthermore, Mangan and Gillespie (2017, pp. 3–4) point to two key challenges 
posed to SM by the law: the gap between the legal treatment of SM and users’ un-
derstanding of that interplay, and SM casually crossing over the private/public law 
divide.  
 
Nevertheless, some of the above discussed, law-backed proposals have already par-
tially materialised (e.g. GDPR or AVMSD within EU, or e.g. public/state regula-
tion, especially of broadcast-type, for example, the German NetzDG law, applying 
to companies with more than two million registered users in the country, or the 
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French ‘anti-hate’ law from May 2020) (DW, 2020), or are becoming real regulato-
ry options (UK regulatory approach, see Spindler, 2017; Theil, 2019; BBC, 2020). 
In some cases, however, even year-long discussions and preparations may not be 
enough to reach consensus on such sensitive legislation, as it happened in Israel in 
2018 (Wootliff, 2018). 
 
Indeed, public regulation, or law in different ways in general, seems to be the most 
recent and probably the final approach to regulation of SM platforms preferred 
amongst the key stakeholders worldwide (in our sample). The most radical regula-
tory proposals (mostly by experts and politicians) include breaking up the tech gi-
ants or strict imposition of antitrust legislation. In the latter case, there have been 
such (partly controversial) decisions taken in Germany in early 2019 (see e.g. 
Schneiders, 2019). Moreover, it should be mentioned that amongst supporters of 
breaking up Facebook, in particular, one can find one of its co-founders, Chris 
Hughes (2019). At the same time, antitrust authorities in France and Australia 
have started negotiating with the SM platforms to provide payments to newspaper 
publishers (Smith, 2020). Thus, antitrust legislation can be used as a tool to make 
SM platforms behave in a more similar way to that of data curators. It was in this 
line of thought, although acting independently, that the quickest and highly con-
troversial input to change legal status of SM platforms came from the US in May 
2020 in the form of an executive order from the US president. It demands that, if 
an SM restricts access to others’ content and goes beyond removing the types of 
objectionable content detailed in the law, it should be deemed a publisher rather 
than a neutral platform – thus losing its legal immunity from lawsuits (Fung, No-
bles, & Liptak, 2020). It is possibly only a threat, but it may ultimately become a 
law, or may have regulatory consequences (Savage, 2020). There are other US 
draft laws, including the Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act 
(“PACT Act”) suggested by a bipartisan group of US Senators in June 2020, that 
would require large platforms to explain how they moderate content through a 
range of mandatory disclosures, and allow consumers to both initiate complaints 
about content and appeal decisions to remove material, among other issues (see 
Cohen, 2020; Davis, 2020; Fingas, 2020). 
 
Targeted advertisements are actually EU-regulated, partially by the E-Commerce 
Directive (in case of social marketing influencers), GDPR and the revised AVMSD 
(with a focus on social media influencers in the latter case). The Italian Competi-
tion and Market Authority (AGCM) and the German courts were amongst the first 
to address this issue (see Goanta and Ranchordás, 2020). An overview of experts’ 
opinions suggests that, although banning micro-targeting would help, it would not 
be a resolution to all the issues related to SM or the internet in general (Edelman, 
2020). 
 
Introducing fines (as suggested by a few individuals in our sample) seems to be a 
way to logically lead to regulation based on law, or at least to state intervention – 
one cannot really issue a fine to private companies without legal justification and 
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state backing, at least in a form allowing an appeal to a court in the most contro-
versial cases. In fact, it is well known that some major SM platforms have already 
received huge fines24 as well as that earlier discussion at the level of the European 
Commission considered issuing huge fines in the case of any breach related to ter-
rorist content on SM (Boffey, 2018). Feierstein goes even further when he argues 
for prohibiting all US federal government agencies from advertising on SM.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this article is to provide an exploratory overview and follow-up cat-
egorisation of regulatory approaches suggested in respect to the regulation of SM 
as presented on global and local scales, and in particular within European and US 
discursive spheres, mainly in the period of 2017–2019. Obviously, this analytical 
exercise could cover only part of a global and local discourse on this important and 
rapidly changing regulatory issue. Alternative suggestions for SM regulation are 
continuously emerging worldwide. Therefore, it should be stressed that this over-
view does not provide a complete and complex picture of the global situation in 
regulatory efforts.  
 
Yet since the suggested indicators or categories seem to be more or less fixed, it is 
quite possible that we have reached sufficient saturation level for being able to 
claim representativeness of our sample (in the sense of representing a majority of 
globally available regulatory suggestions). Moreover, this study has value as a re-
flection of an important section of global discussion about regulatory options and 
trends at a crucial point in history of a new, and from a public discourse/sphere 
perspective, crucial communication technology. Our initial exploration forms the 
basis of a more conclusive research as well as aids in determining the research de-
sign and sampling methodology (and related challenges) for further, more in-
depth or geographically25, linguistically or temporarily focused research. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some tangible findings. The results of media-facilitated 
(mainly political, expert and journalistic) discourses on SM regulation suggest 
that, in the current, rather specialised academic fields, including public regulatory 
policies specialists, there is a distinct need for more diverse and more innovative 
regulatory approaches. Moreover, a law may have different content, purpose and 
enforcement procedures. For example, a law or regulation, in general, may provide 
incentives or sanctions (see e.g. Agrell, 2015; Balkin & Zittrain, 2016). On the one 
hand, there is a clear trend (and often reality) towards hard law regulation of SM 
in many countries, while key SM platforms at the same time, reluctantly, are intro-
ducing institutional self-regulatory measures and some co-regulatory measures. 
 
24 See Antitrust: Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive practices in online advertising, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770 
25 For example, an earlier study by Mutiz, Hoyos, Leguizamón and Gómez (2011) identified three 
geographically based emerging regulatory models for SM: a) European model, b) US Model c) Latin 
American model. 
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There are rare, controversial, emotion-based, but still potentially significant (con-
sidering origin and location, as well as market position, of many key SM platforms) 
calls for no regulation of content on SM as presented by US President Trump in 
2020. Ironically, this ‘de-regulation’ would mean, ultimately, putting SM on the 
same footing as legacy media. There is some theoretical and empirical rationale 
behind this change of paradigm. Indeed, the overview of this study has detected 
that legislation targeting SM is actually being implemented in many countries, 
while there are at the same time strong arguments made for considering large SM 
to be at the same level as legacy media.  
 
It should be mentioned that we have identified (but not included here due to space 
limitation, with exception of US President Trump) some of the marginal voices ar-
guing against any regulation, and in particular against public/state regulation. 
However, highly knowledgeable stakeholders, such as Tim Berners-Lee (founder of 
the Internet protocol), Brad Smith (Microsoft), Tim Cook (Apple CEO) or Mark 
Zuckerberg (Facebook co-founder), have called for more regulation, and specifical-
ly for public/state regulation or co-regulation. Nick Clegg, Facebook’s head of 
global affairs said: ‘It’s not for private companies, however big or small, to come up 
with those rules. It is for democratic politicians in the democratic world to do so’ 
(AFP, 2019). Most recently, Zuckerberg envisioned some kind of a third regulatory 
structure that would be positioned somewhere between that of newspapers and 
telephones (Wintour, 2020). 
 
Voices against SM regulation could have been – perhaps – seen as relevant until 
the two global scandals mentioned in the introduction, the Facebook–Cambridge 
Analytica scandal and the live broadcasting of the Christchurch massacre on Fa-
cebook, shook global public opinion. Since then, a tide has shifted towards the 
need for SM regulation (or, at least, to enforce/adjust existing general penal or civ-
ic legislation). 
 
Fundamentally, there is an increasing tendency to enforce traditional law-based 
(sometimes called ‘business’) regulation for SM, similar to television and radio 
broadcast regulation. This is the main trend identified both within a global dis-
course and in actual regulation in the majority of countries that so far have intro-
duced SM regulation. It is not surprising then that support for this type of regula-
tion comes from the voices of traditional media regulators as well as from politi-
cians (both liberal democratic as well as more authoritarian populist ones). How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that this is the best or the final approach for 
SM regulation. 
 
As mentioned above, not all types of regulation can be seen as necessarily based 
directly on (regulatory) legislation. Within our sample, the most innovative stream 
of suggestions seems to focus on establishing independently owned servers and/or 
new publicly owned social media. These policy options deal with regulation indi-
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rectly, through supporting plurality or competition.26 Yet, these options may con-
tribute to addressing some of the aspects related to the harm caused by SM only to 
a very limited degree by putting market and public opinion pressure on major SM 
platforms. Ultimately, there will still be some need for regulation either for private-
ly or publicly owned platforms.  
 
There are also some relevant technical solutions, such as Noble’s proposal that fu-
ture public platforms should set limits on how quickly content circulates, or how 
content is prioritised. This may help, and it has actually been partly included in the 
algorithms used by Facebook and some other SM, but it is difficult to imagine how 
effectively it would work for handling the former issue. There have also been sug-
gestions focused on limiting the time spent on SM by an average user, using direct 
and indirect motivations (‘nudging’, providing technical solutions or levelling taxa-
tion). 
 
The other traditional regulatory alternatives seem to be focused on breaking up the 
tech giants and/or enforcing antitrust, and/or copyright and/or data privacy legis-
lation. In the latter case, there were such (partly controversial) decisions taken in 
Germany in early 2019, while for the former issue, Australia and France are now 
moving ahead in that direction. 
 
As the discussion on SM regulation continues, we hope that this taxonomy over-
view and analytical interpretation and contextualisation of identified suggestions 
for SM regulation can help not only media and communication scholars, but also 
lawyers, regulatory and policy experts and policymakers to widen their perspec-
tives on SM regulation. There is still time for more debate – it is expected that the 
targeted 2020 planned comprehensive SM regulation within the EU will not be fi-
nalised any sooner than three years after that date (i.e. around 2023), maybe even 
later (Kukliš in Struhárik, 2020). Although there have already been adopted some 
national SM regulatory solutions either at the EU member state level, or in many 
non-EU states, still, for many, the EU (and within the EU, it is Germany) has a 
special model to follow role, or certainly has global impact,27 and thus a responsi-
bility within the global regulatory discourses and regulatory efforts (see e.g. Schul-
ze, 2019). 
 
26 For an alternative, and within the EU a widely used competion-based approach, see a Fair, 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime, in Heim and Nikolic (2019). 
27 For example, Zuckerberg mentioned during his hearing in the Congress of the US on 11 April 
2018, by answering a question about GDPR:”All the same controls will be available around the 
world.” Available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/HHRG-115-
IF00-Transcript-20180411.pdf, p. 52. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Global and Local Narratives for Regulating Social Media 
Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Sullivan (2013)28 
Sky Deutschland head 
Country: Germany 
We have to learn how to deal with the (social) media. 
Avni (2015) 
son of a terrorism 
victim 
Country: Israel 
We must require social media companies to proactively remove all 
incitement to violence and establish heavy civil and criminal 
penalties for failure to comply.  
Pitruzzella (2016)29  
AGCOM head 
Country: Italy 
Regulation of misinformation on the internet is best done by the 
state, rather than by social media companies such as Facebook. He 
also suggested the creation of an EU independent body to label fake 
news and remove it from circulation or impose fines when necessary. 
Mutabazi (in Lumu, 
2016; Amamukirori 
(2017) 
executive director of 
Uganda 
Communications 
Commission (UCC)  
Country: Uganda 
He has rooted for strict regulation of social platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp.  
 
„We need a future network that unites us as Africans, manned in 
Africa, so that we are also able to protect our own people,"  
Richardson (2017) 
Council of Europe 
There is only one correct way on how to enforce age limits when 
accessing social media and it is gathering personal data from 
children and cross matching anything that could inform about the 
child’s age. 
Social media providers will also need to track their location to know 
which age requirement applies. 
Karentay (2017) 
IT expert 
Country: USA 
First, content standards should be interpreted and operationalized 
on social media platforms through an inclusive mechanism. 
Second, Governments and social media companies should establish a 
system of public accountability. 
Third, governments and social media companies should both make 
commitments, and be held jointly accountable, to public goals. 
Klöckner (2017) 
politician (CDU) 
Country: Germany 
To put social media on equal regulatory level with legacy media. 
Brock (2017) 
researcher, 
Department of 
Journalism, University 
of London 
Country: UK 
At the minimum, a high degree of transparency from platforms 
should be required, not just about the algorithms they use, but also 
about all aspects of their operations. 
Jourová in Valášek 
(2018) 
European 
Commissionair 
I prefer self-regulation. SM platforms should follow existing law as 
well as how hate speech is defined by courts, clearly mark political 
ads, delete fake accounts, but leave political speech free. 
 
 
28 Found in: https://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/gestaendns-von-brian-sullivan-sky-
deutschland-chef-meidet-facebook-und-google-plus_aid_1130842.html 
29 Found in: Freedom on the Net, Italy, (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
net/2018/italy  
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Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
European Union 
Lucas (2018) 
Journalist; CEPA vice-
president  
Country: Latvia 
The solution to fake news is education and vigilance from all parts of 
society. 
Meier (2018) 
EP's Adviser to the 
ALDE Group on 
Culture, Education, 
Media and Sport 
European Union 
The rules governing the legacy media should apply to Facebook as 
well. 
 
Heinla (2018) 
Kantar Emor research 
expert 
Country: Estonia 
Trustworthiness is a clear advantage of national legacy media and 
therefore PSM must continue to be supported (when facing negative 
aspects of social media platforms). 
Heitmann (2018) 
writer; journalist 
Country: Germany 
Freedom of information also includes the right to influence others 
and also to be influenced by oneself, the key is to learn how to handle 
it properly. 
Ognyanova (2018) 
lawyer 
Country: Bulgaria 
There are two important conditions for the safe operation of social 
networks - transparency, regarding the issues of the platform, trends 
and how it moves over time and an independent appeal process. 
Borata (2018) 
expert in media law 
Country: Spain 
There is a growing tendency in international law to recognize and 
emphasize the responsibility, also, of private actors and corporations 
in the adequate protection of human rights. For this reason, it is up 
to the public authorities to guarantee, first of all, that the internal or 
community standards of social networks are, in terms of content, 
clear and precise and do not contain unreasonable, arbitrary or may 
give rise to excessive limitations on users' freedom of expression. 
Secondly, it is also necessary to guarantee, through adequate 
regulatory mechanisms, that the internal procedures for content 
removal, account deactivation or other similar actions are 
transparent, proportionate, and allow the intervention of those 
affected, with the possibility also of go to impartial appeals. 
Jürgen (2018) 
attorney-at-law 
Country: Estonia 
A parent is a person who is responsible for the child's safety. 
(including on social media) 
Boskin (2018) 
Professor of 
Economics at Stanford 
University 
Country: USA 
The goal should be to limit the downsides of technology without 
stifling innovation – five issues to consider e.g. privacy. 
Habeck (2018)30 
politician (Green 
party) 
Country: Germany  
A more advanced anti-monopoly legislation. 
Villmann (2018) 
creative director 
Country: Estonia 
Be aware whether social media discourse presents minority opinion 
(more likely) or majority opinion (less likely). 
Hughes (2019) Called Facebook a monopoly that should be forced to spin off 
 
30 Found in: https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/nach-datenmissbrauch-gruenen-chef-
habeck-will-gegen-facebook-vorgehen_id_8697209.html 
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Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Facebook co-founder 
Country: USA 
WhatsApp and Instagram, with future acquisitions banned for 
several years. 
- a new federal agency to regulate tech companies whose ''first 
mandate is to protect privacy.''  
Dekov (2018) 
Business Intelligence 
Expert 
Country: Bulgaria 
The advice to everyone is to get acquainted with the social security 
options of any social network. From time to time it is worthwhile to 
visit them again because social networks and technologies are 
evolving. 
Wu (2018) 
law professor  
Country: USA 
The ideal competitor and successor to Facebook would be a platform 
that actually puts its goals first (“bring us closer together” and “build 
a global community.”).  
Jun (2018) 
Country: China 
Without proper supervision and management from the government, 
major tech companies will simply take their customers' privacy as no 
big deal. 
Woira (2018) 
self-defined „Pan 
Africanist“  
Country: Uganda  
 
The reason I will stick to supporting the issue of taxing SM is that at 
least this noise will decrease ….because it will increase our revenue in 
the coffers so we get reasonable services. ..… 
Muwema (2018) 
lawyer 
Country: Uganda 
It is my argument that by proposing a further tax on SM users 
instead of the SM platform owners, the Governmentt of Uganda has 
missed the silver lining. 
Mutibwa (2018) 
Head of Tax, Banking 
and Finance at Signum 
Advocates  
Country: Uganda 
The digital platforms need to be taxed. Whether the direct tax is the 
best way to have the same addressed is a question of discussion.  
Muhangi (2018) 
managing partner of 
the Ortus (K Muhangi 
Advocates) 
Technology, Media, 
Telecommunications 
and Intellectual 
property Law 
practitioner 
Country: Uganda  
Without adequate data protection laws or national data security and 
retention policies, there can be no assurance that your personal data 
will not end up in the wrong hands. Data protection is globally 
recognised as a distinct fundamental human right.  
Ivančík (2018) 
historian 
Country: Slovakia 
Data protection regulation. 
Raud (2018), 
scholar; author 
Country: Estonia 
Ensure maximum possible plurality of opinions with equal status on 
social media. 
Käsper (2018) 
lecturer of European 
Law 
Country: Estonia 
A strict law of political advertising, greater transparency of messages 
and targets, and informing users are needed. 
Dayen (2018) 
author 
Country: USA 
To disallow all individually targeted ads, with large fines or even 
removal from the public airwaves for repeated violations. Nothing 
tied to a user’s identity should be used to serve them a particular 
message. Companies would have to make all ads on its networks 
publicly viewable and searchable, so regulators can oversee them.  
Vol.10No.1Spring/Summer 2020  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
42 
 
Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Marcus (2018) 
Professor of 
Leadership and 
Governance 
Country: UK 
Facebook needs to take responsibility for its behaviour in a way 
befitting its influence, by changing its governance and operational 
behaviour. 
Tremonti (2018) 
citizen 
Country: Italy 
What is fundamental is not only the protection of “privacy”, but more 
generally the protection of the integrity of the “person” in the digital 
dimension… For once, instead of insisting on regulating as little as 
possible, the European Commission has seriously embarked on the 
right path, not only by proposing a web tax, but also with proposed 
regulations to guarantee the transparency of platforms to the benefit 
of the small and medium enterprises that use them.  
Tufekci (2018b) 
social media expert 
Country: USA/Turkey 
We should discuss outlawing invasive digital tracking (online or 
offline), merging data from multiple sources, and maybe even micro-
targeting based on surveillance. We could also use some real 
employee pressure. 
Hendrix (2018) 
Executive Director of 
NYC Media Lab 
Country: USA 
Greater transparency to governments and independent researchers. 
Accountability to citizens. 
Responsibility for addressing externalities. 
Soros (2018) 
philantropist/investor 
Country: 
USA/international 
SM should be regulated more strictly, to maintain competition, 
innovation as well as fair and equitable access to services. 
Open Society 
Institute (2018) 
Country: Bulgaria 
Since it appears that there is important correlation between quality 
education and freedom of the media on the one hand, and trust in 
fake news and hoaxes, more support should be given to quality 
education and freedom of the media. 
McNamee (2018) 
Investor; venture 
capitalist; musician 
Country: USA 
Public regulation and education. 
Křetínský (2018) 
Billlionaire; 
enterpreneur 
Country: 
France/Czech 
Republic 
The role of the press is crucial for understanding complexities 
of world. There also is a need for regulating SM – aren’t these 
medium, if they have four million followers? It s time to change 
rules of the game. The Czech Republic is too small to enforce 
new regulation for SM, that is why I have invested in the 
French media market.  
Zittrain (2018) 
Harvard professor; co-
founder of the 
Berkman Klein Center 
for Internet & Society  
Country: USA 
SM platforms should introduce practices and technologies aimed at a 
sea change on user privacy and autonomy. 
Hadas-Lebel (2018) 
author; politician 
Country: France 
Better media literacy and new categorisation of social platforms that 
would give them editorial responsibility. 
Mayer-Schönberger 
(2018)  
researcher 
Country: Austria/UK 
First, better privacy through direct state control. 
Second, data sharing obligation. Facebook has to make a random 
part of its data accessible to competitors in order to break its 
informational power. 
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Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Pikus (2018) 
IT expert 
Country: Slovakia 
Try to learn how to set up the level of privacy. 
Orbán (2018) 
civil servant 
Country: Hungary 
A good regulation cannot be achieved without the intervention of the 
state. 
Sängerlaub (in 
Slezáková, 2018), 
journalist; researcher 
Country: Germany 
It is important to be transparent, especially the media. 
Bátky (2018) 
editor-in-chief PC 
review 
Country: Hungary 
One cannot expect the social media to make their rules of data 
protection stricter forever, otherwise we can end up with blurred 
Facebook profile pictures, or a three-round verification process 
needed to post a picture of a cat. 
Nye (2018) 
political scientist 
Country: USA 
Investigative journalism and alerting the public in advance can help 
inoculate voters against disinformation campaigns. 
Schutz (2018) 
journalist 
Country: Slovakia 
To pay regular taxes. 
(it is well-known that social media platforms pay only symbolic 
taxes) 
Kováčik (2018) 
journalist 
Country: Slovakia 
Public regulation. 
Cook (2018) 
Apple CEO 
Country: USA 
... we have to admit when the free market is not working. And it 
hasn't worked here. 
Rodríguez (2018) 
journalist 
Country: Colombia 
 The situation is crying out for regulation. 
Owen (2018) 
Beaverbrook Chair in 
Media, Ethics; 
Communication and 
associate professor in 
the Max Bell School of 
Public Policy at McGill 
University 
Country: Canada 
The governments can bring sunlight to the world of micro-targeted 
advertising through new transparency laws. They can overhaul data-
privacy regimes that are limited in scope, weak in capacity and unco-
ordinated globally. They can mandate the identification of automated 
accounts so that citizens know when they are engaging with a 
machine or a human. They can modernize tax and competition policy 
for the digital economy. And they can fund large-scale digital literacy 
initiatives for citizens of all ages. 
This is going to require bringing together the private sector and civil 
society in a hard discussion about the nature and limits of free 
speech, about who is censored online and how, about responsibilities 
for moderating speech at scale, and about universal versus national 
speech norms. 
Democracies will need to start co-ordinating their public-policy 
efforts around emerging technologies, too. There is currently a 
disconnect between the global scale, operation and social impact of 
technology companies and the national jurisdiction of most 
countries' tech laws and regulations. As former BlackBerry co-CEO 
Jim Balsillie has argued, the digital economy may need its Bretton 
Woods moment. 
Tusikov and 
Haggart (2019) 
academics 
First, it’s necessary to prohibit the data-intensive, micro-targeted 
advertising-dependent business model that is at the heart of the 
problem. 
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Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Country: Canada Second, it’s vital that countries craft rules that are appropriate to 
their particular domestic social, legal and political contexts. 
Third, and most provocatively, it’s time to consider non-commercial 
ownership of social-media entities — including non-profit or some 
form of public ownership  
Afoko (2019) 
Activist; Strategic 
communications 
specialis 
Country: UK 
But ultimately no regulation of tech giants will work unless users are 
involved. 
Barrett (in Grigonis, 
2018) 
Deputy Director at the 
NYU Center for 
Business Rights and 
Human Development  
Country: USA 
While SM platforms shouldn’t be held liable for such content, the 
research suggests the platforms can — and should — do more to 
regulate content. The legislation to apply the same laws to social 
media ads that apply to political ads on the TV and radio, is one 
example of laws that wouldn’t overreach. But, if SM companies step 
up their efforts against politically motivated misinformation and 
terrorist propaganda, government involvement wouldn’t be 
necessary. SM networks should enhance their own governance, 
continue to refine the algorithms, use more “friction” — like 
warnings and notifications for suspicious content — expand human 
oversight, adjust advertising, and continue to share knowledge with 
other networks to reach those goals.  
Reporters without 
Borders 
(2018, 2019) 
Journalism Trust Initiative 
Publicly labelling high quality versus low quality journalism. 
Thomas (2019) 
researcher at ASPI’s 
International Cyber 
Policy Centre 
Country: Australia 
Regulators should consider when tackling violent content online: 
First, conceptual clarity. What are we trying to achieve, and is this 
the best way to achieve it? 
Second, technical feasibility. How will it work in practice, and is it 
really going to be an improvement on the current situation? 
Third, regulators need to consider adverse consequences. For 
example, an increased crackdown by the big social media players will 
not take this content offline; it will simply disperse it more widely. 
Gutiérrez (2019) 
President of the 
Institute of 
Transparency, Access 
to Public Information, 
Protection of Personal 
Data and 
Accountability of 
Mexico City (INFO) 
Country: Mexico 
We conclude that s a joint regulation through norms built in the 
international community and directed to the interior of the States, 
for which it is necessary and it is urgent to carry out a comprehensive 
diagnosis involving specialized authorities and bodies, academics, 
civil society, the technical community, and the private sector, among 
other actors at the local level, aimed at a national scale and 
subsequently at an international level, so that in this area, the bases 
are developed that allow, in principle, the enforceability of digital 
rights. 
Swisher (2019), 
journalist; editor at 
large for the 
technology news 
website Recode 
Country: USA 
Suggestions for tech industry CEOs: Embrace transparency, hold 
leaders accountable, avoid groupthink, invest in diversity, don´t be 
afraid of self-reflection. 
Benton (2019) 
director of the Nieman 
Journalism Lab 
Country: UK 
In order to decrease misinformation, it is useful to make a story´s 
age more prominent, both to readers and to those who might only 
see a link on social media without clicking through. 
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Fitzgerald (2019) 
politician 
Country: Ireland 
All media, and particularly PSM must look into how they handle 
group-think. 
Melioris (2019) 
economist 
Country: Slovakia 
Taxation, international cooperation. 
Esslinger (2019) 
journalist 
Country: Germany 
SM must be regulated. 
UK MPs (2019)31 
Country: UK 
UK MPs call for social media content regulator financed by a special 
levy. 
Michalovová (2019) 
lawyer 
Country: Slovakia 
Media and digital literacy. 
Kukliš (2019) 
media regulator 
Country: Slovakia 
(and ERGA) 
Business-type regulation 
(SM seen as something between traditional media and service 
providers). 
Marcuzzi and Terzi 
(2019) 
researchers 
international 
International co-operation, platforms as a public service, business-
type regulation. 
Mahdawi (2019) 
journalist 
Country: UK 
We need to crack down on the use of personal information for all 
targeted advertising. 
Han Sang-hyuk (in 
Hyun-kyung, 2019), 
chairman of the Korea 
Communications 
Commission 
Country: Korea 
He considered the establishment of an independent institution 
responsible for checking facts. It would then brief a fake news 
committee about their findings. Then the committee would send 
findings to respective media outlets to help them self-regulate fake 
news.  
In Hyun-bin (2020) 
Country: Korea 
Participants of the forum held at the National Assembly in 
November 2019:  
The nation needs to make education on media ethics mandatory at 
schools, and have media content providers, both individuals and 
companies, receive such education as well.  
Doctorow (2019) 
author; tech activist 
Country: UK 
One possibility is to create an absolute legal defence for companies 
that make "interoperable" products (from ad-blocking to switching 
app) stores that plug into the dominant companies' offerings. Use 
antitrust to promote interoperability. 
Vrabel (in ČTK, 
iDNES.cz, 2019) 
Director, Semantic 
Visions  
Country: Czech 
Republic 
SM platforms should have the same responsibility as publishers. 
Verhofstadt, 2019 
and Verhofstadt (in 
Heath & Štrba, 2019) 
EU Parliament 
We need a European Facebook, an update of antimonopoly 
legislation, transparency of algorithms, breaking up big technology 
companies 
 
31 Found in: https://www.ft.com/content/600a4cde-32c5-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812 
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Gibbs (2019) 
citizen 
Country: UK 
What we really need is for adults to stop condemning social media 
sites, and start trying to understand them rather than trying to block 
it from view. 
Sharockman (in 
Jančárik, 2019) 
Country: USA 
He supports rather self-regulation (by platforms) then regulation by 
governments. The governments should provide access to trustworthy 
and reliable information, including support to journalism and media 
literacy. Journalists should provide sources and facts. 
Giegold (2019) 
MEP for Germany 
(Green pary) 
To use anti-monopoly legislation. 
Brodnig (2019) 
journalist, author 
Country: Austria 
The EU should use anti-trust legislation. 
Malik (2019) 
journalist 
Country: Pakistan 
The prior restraint model is an obsolete mechanism to regulate free 
speech on social networks. If speech needs be regulated, it should be 
by judicial determination, and not executive decisions. 
Combating fake news should be done through public information 
campaigns which sensitise the population on the need to fact-check 
their sources of online content. 
Raddi (2019) 
MD/PhD student 
Country: USA 
A combination of existing policy tools — heavily taxing private social 
media companies, for example, and banning targeted advertisement 
and the use of personal information for commercial gain — would 
softly sentence Facebook to death. Especially if they are combined 
with new, high-quality public social media alternatives. 
Greer (2019) 
Deputy Director of the 
viral digital rights 
group Fight for the 
Future 
Country: UK 
Hefty fines, civil rights audits, antitrust, data privacy legislation, 
shareholder activism and employee organizing. 
Scott (2019) 
tech journalist 
Politico 
In the race to regulate Big Tech, there is one rule of thumb - whoever 
moves first gets to write the rules. 
Geist (2019) 
journalist 
Country: Slovakia 
Either efficient self-regulation or, for example, to raise criminal 
negligence charges. 
Solano (2019) 
communication 
consultant 
Country: Colombia 
It is preferable to work intensively in educating users.  
Danko (2019) 
politician in Kollárová 
Country: Slovakia 
Taxation. 
Morozov (2019) 
writer; researcher 
Country: USA 
Breaking up the tech giants, having them pay a fair share of taxes, 
making better use of their data are all necessary but, alas, insufficient 
conditions for effective social – not just individual or institutional – 
transformation. 
Vaidhyanathan 
(2019) 
professor of Media 
Studies 
Country: UK 
Each country will have to assess how its social, cultural and political 
health is affected by Facebook. Each will have to approach Facebook 
as part of an information ecosystem, connected intimately with other 
systems of expression and media forms like television and news 
services. Each will have to assess how much power it wants Facebook 
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to have in that ecosystem. Each will have to deploy an array of 
responses to mitigate the negative consequences of Facebook while 
recognizing its value in people’s lives. 
Tufekci (2018a) 
writer; academic; 
techno-sociologist 
Country: Turkey/USA 
These are deeply political decisions. 
Zuckerberg (2019) 
Facebook founder 
Country: USA 
We need a more active role for governments and regulators. A new 
regulation is needed in four areas – harmful content, election 
integrity, privacy and data portability. 
Government of 
India (Doval, 2019) 
Country: India 
The government is all set to make changes to the IT rules which will 
make it mandatory for SM and ISP to provide traceability of those 
posting information on their platforms as well as to remove 
malicious content receiving a court order, or when notified by the 
government. Finally, it will be a must for companies with more than 
50 lakh users to have an office in India and appoint a nodal officer 
for liaising with law enforcement agencies. 
Smith (2019a) 
Microsoft’s President 
and Chief Legal Officer 
Country: USA 
A greater emphasis on preventing the abuse of their technology 
through both technological and human processes. "The tech sector 
needs to do more on its own, the tech sector needs to do more with 
governments and NGOs, [and] we need to recognise that the law, 
regulation and governments have an increasing role to play in this 
space. Ultimately, we need to develop an industry-wide approach 
that will be principled, comprehensive and effective...The tech sector 
should consider creating a “major event” protocol, in which 
technology companies would work from a joint virtual command 
centre during a major incident. 
Aktoudianakis 
(2019) 
Open Society 
European Policy 
Institute 
Policymakers must affirm citizens’ “right of access to data which has 
been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified”, content on social media be “subject to control by an 
independent authority” that ensures its “compliance” with the 
relevant law, to protect free expression by combating propaganda 
and state-sponsored trolling.  
Berners-Lee (2019) 
Director of the World 
Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) 
Country: UK 
Big internet platforms and social media companies must be regulated 
to prevent the worldwide web from being "weaponized at scale. 
Newport (2019) 
associate professor of 
computer science at 
Georgetown University 
Country: USA 
Freedom of expression is also affected by server ownership, the 
solution are new social media on independently owned servers. One 
of the systems is called POSSE, for “publish on your own site, 
syndicate elsewhere”- encourages competition and innovation while 
allowing users to vote with their feet. However, the author does not 
see this as a realistic alternative. 
The Secretariat of 
the Internet and 
Jurisdiction Policy 
Network (2019) 
Framework clarity, proportionality, procedural guarantees, 
accountability. 
Svantesson (2019) 
Co-Director of the 
Centre for 
Commercial Law at 
the Faculty of Law 
Ultimately, what we need are multi-stakeholder discussions 
involving governments, the tech industry, civil society and academia. 
Vol.10No.1Spring/Summer 2020  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
48 
 
Author/Country Policy Suggestions 
Country: Australia 
Pennycook and 
Rand (in Dizikes, 
2019) 
researchers 
Country: USA 
The crowdsourcing approach – e.g. building audience judgments into 
an algorithm ranking stories by quality. 
Collins (in Hern, 
2019) 
politician 
Country: UK 
Formalising FB relationship with its third-party fact checkers “in the 
long-term” 
Porter (2019) 
attorney general (in 
Karp) 
Country: Australia 
To create level playing field between social media platforms and 
traditional media. 
King (in Boffney, 
2019) 
European Commission 
The platforms would need to open themselves to greater scrutiny to 
outside organisations if the EU was to stand by the voluntary code of 
conduct. 
Coatney (2019) 
digital media 
consultant; former 
director of Tumblr  
Country: USA 
We need a PBS for Social Media. 
 
Cohen (in Lomas, 
2019) 
actor  
Country: USA 
Broadcast-style regulation that sets basic standards and practices of 
what content isn’t acceptable for them to amplify to billions. 
Some of the 
lawmakers at the 
Senate Judiciary 
subcommittee on 
anti-trust 
(in McColey, 2019) 
Country: USA 
Some US Senators pressed top antitrust regulators to aggressively 
investigate the power of the country’s biggest tech companies, with 
some lawmakers questioning whether the officials had the will or 
resources to take action. 
Facebook 
Employees 
(October 2019) 
Hundreds of Facebook employees have signed a letter to CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg and other executives saying they oppose the social 
network’s policy of letting politicians lie in advertisements. 
Benioff 32 
CEO; Internet 
entrepreneur 
International 
 Social Media should be regulated as tobacco industry. 
Mazzucato (2019) 
founder/director of the 
Institute for 
Innovation and Public 
Purpose; professor at 
University College 
London 
Country: UK 
We need to develop a new governance structure, which starts with 
creating a new vocabulary. For example, calling platform companies 
“tech giants” implies they have invested in the technologies from 
which they are profiting, when it was really taxpayers who funded the 
key underlying technologies – from the Internet to GPS. We will 
need to rethink the governance of data, develop new institutions, and 
experiment with alternative forms of ownership. 
Basu (2019) 
former Chief 
Economist of the 
A successful strategy will have to look beyond antitrust laws. For the 
most influential platforms, governments may consider pushing a 
 
32 Found in: Focus (2019).  
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World Bank; former 
Chief Economic 
Adviser to the 
Government of India; 
professor of 
Economics at Cornell 
University 
Country: India/USA 
gradual shift to non-profit models, akin to public utilities. 
McDonald (2019) 
digital anthropologist 
at Leading Edge 
Forum 
Country: UK 
Facebook and others shouldn’t ban political ads, they should be 
banning targeted advertising and take a firmer stance on 
misinformation and disinformation.  
Zuboff (in Kavenna, 
2019) 
Author; scholar 
Country: USA 
Regulation. This is what the tech companies fear most. 
Buttarelli (2019) 
EU’s chief data 
protection regulator 
To enforce transparency of dominant tech companies. 
To prohibit harmful practices, including profiling and behavioural 
targeting of children and young people and for political purposes,” 
To build a “European digital commons” to support “open-source 
tools and interoperability between platforms, a right to one’s own 
identity or identities, unlimited use of digital infrastructure in the 
EU, encrypted communications, and prohibition of behaviour 
tracking and censorship by dominant platforms”. “Antitrust, 
democracies’ tool for restraining excessive market power. EU’s Data 
Protection Board 
Pope (2019) 
Country: Vatican  
Tech companies should prevent kids from viewing porn – self-
regulation. 
 
Amnesty 
International (2019) 
It is “now evident that the era of self-regulation in the tech sector is 
coming to an end” — state-based regulation will be necessary. 
Eisenreich (2019) 
Minister of Justice 
Country: Germany 
(Bavaria) 
The platforms should be regulated at the same level as legacy media. 
Tugend (2019) 
Country: USA 
Government regulation, public pressure, worker action. 
Weissmann (2019) 
Country: USA 
Revisiting the federal Office of Technology Assessment 
Applying Yale Professor Jack Balkin´s “information fiduciary” model 
for social media companies  
Van Alstyne (in 
Schmid, 2019) 
professor at Boston 
University; research 
associate at the MIT 
Initiative on the 
Digital Economy 
Country: USA 
The ideal solution is really somewhere in between EU and USA 
approaches, continuing to have companies create value, but taking 
into consideration the European approach of fair allocation. 
Legislation needs to consider how value—for both consumers and 
companies—is being created (supply-side or demand-side). 
Scalzi 
(in Newitz, 2019) 
We should turn the whole system on its head with an intense 
emphasis on the value of curation by individual users – a more 
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science fiction author 
Country: USA 
robust, comprehensive version of privacy settings, where news and 
entertainment would reach you only after you opted into them. This 
could include a few cheap services with ads and more expensive 
without. Crowdfunding could create a public broadcasting version of 
video sharing. Apps and devices to help people curate the content. 
Noble (in Newitz, 
2019) 
professor at the 
University of 
California at Los 
Angeles  
Country: USA 
Slow media – future public platforms set limits on how quickly 
content circulates. It is completely different business model. 
Shane (in Newitz, 
2019) 
algorithm designer; 
author 
Country: USA 
We need humans to maintain and curate the digital public spaces we 
actually want. 
Busse (2019) 
journalist 
Country: Germany 
It is not to be expected that the platforms will self-regulate - there 
must be political intervention. 
Hall (in Newitz, 2019) 
co-founder and 
Director of Strategy at 
Mule 
Country: USA 
To create digital public spaces that imitate actual town halls. 
Kendall (in Newitz, 
2019) 
writer 
Country: USA 
Returning to pratice known as meeting face-to-face. People who aren 
t willing to meet in person, simply won t be trusted. In virtual spaces, 
if avatares are claiming to be part of a group, but nobody in that 
group has met them, it would be an instant warning sign. 
Pakistan Press 
Foundation (2020) 
Country: Pakistan 
 In reaction to rules regulating SM approved by the Federal Cabinet 
in secrecy without any practical discussion or consultation with the 
stakeholders, „The promotion of responsible content moderation is, 
in fact, the ultimate goal towards which any regulatory mechanism 
should strive for, however, the distinction must be drawn between 
regulating and controlling the social media platforms.“ 
Brossi (2020) 
citizen 
Country: Chile 
 
It is necessary to regulate, not to restrict freedom of expression, but 
on the contrary, so that governments and large digital corporations 
create equitable conditions for access and distribution of quality 
information, essential for any democratic society. An important 
debate that must take place in regulatory terms is about transparency 
and algorithmic responsibility. 
 
Dans (2020) 
Professor of 
Innovation at IE 
Business School 
Country: Spain 
 
Eliminate the incentive to trafficking data, give users the tools to 
report when they suspect wrongdoing, and force all those who have 
built economic empires around it to rethink their business based on 
more acceptable model.  
Feierstein (2020), 
CEO of Glacier 
Environmental Fund  
Country: USA 
Set up an independent panel of experts. Provide whistleblower 
protection and reward to any SM employee willing to provide 
evidence that leads to the conviction of management and other 
employee. 
Prohibiting all US federal government agencies from advertising on 
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SM.  
Gauci (2020) 
managing partner at 
GTG Advocates and 
Caledo; lectures on 
legal futures and 
technology at the 
University of Malta 
Country: Malta 
To impose measures on SM to be more transparent and fair with 
users, and to have more social responsibility, enforcing transparency 
and require SM companies to act fairly and make it easier for users to 
track the amount of time they spend on their platforms, to empower 
the user to self-exclude himself like in the gaming industry on the 
time users can spend on a platform across all devices, along with 
more programmes for digital literacy and awareness of the effects of 
excessive SM use from SM companies. 
Aro (in Ciglerová, 
2020) 
journalist 
Country: Finland 
We can put pressure on SM. 
Balkin (2020) 
Knight Professor of 
Constitutional Law 
and the First 
Amendment at Yale 
Law School.  
Country: USA 
First, you must give incentives to SM to adopt professional and 
public-regarding norms. Second, you must make SM internalize 
some of the costs they impose on the world around them.  
The goal should be to increase the number of players.The goal should 
be to give SM companies incentives to professionalize and take 
responsibility for the health of the public sphere. (Antitrust and 
competition law, Privacy and consumer protection law, Balancing 
intermediary liability with intermediary immunity, public pressure 
and media coverage of social media companies can help). 
 
 
 
 
